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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DAVID C. STREETER, : Case No. 930206-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Emphasis added. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE POLICE VIOLATED MR. STREETER'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE FIRST 
INTERROGATION. 
The State's argument that the incriminating 
statements made in the second interrogation are properly admissible 
is premised on a series of faulty premises and incorrect 
interpretations of the law. 
A. "NO" IS NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
The State erroneously asserts that "Police ceased 
interrogation when defendant unequivocally invoked his Miranda 
rights." State's brief at Point I.A., pp. 14-20. When the police 
asked if he "wished to speak to us now without an attorney 
present," David responded "No." This very first response was an 
unequivocal invocation, and was not honored. The interrogation 
should have ended then and there.1 David had invoked his fifth 
amendment rights to silence and counsel. Continued interrogation 
^he State's argument at p. 17 concerning the confusing nature 
of the question, "Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak 
to us without an attorney present?", is sophistry. Even a person 
of David Streeter's tender years and somewhat below average 
intelligence is able to understand this question. 
2 
was a fifth amendment violation, as well as a violation of article 
I section 12 of the Utah Constitution.2 
B, UNDER UTAH LAW,3 AMBIGUOUS INVOCATIONS 
MUST BE CLARIFIED, AND ARE NOT CLARIFIED 
BY SUBSTANTIVE INTERROGATION. 
Even if "No" were equivocal, Officer Cowley did not limit 
further questions to clarification: 
TC: Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that 
attitude with us. 
DS: Well I ain't trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we 
know who has done what and who has done what to 
who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it 
now. Now do you understand that? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Who were you with tonight [?] 
2The State further ignores the trial court's comments on this 
point. During argument, the following transpired: 
[by defense counsel]: It's our position, your 
honor, that during the initial interview conducted by 
Detective Cowley, that upon -- when the defendant 
indicated no, the very first time, that the interview 
should have stopped at that point. 
The court: There's no question about that. 
R. 237:2-7. The trial court correctly found that "No" was not 
ambiguous, and rejected Officer Cowley's testimony that the 
statement required clarification. 
3Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 
L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), decided after Mr. Streeter's opening brief was 
filed, has changed federal law in the context of ambiguous requests 
for counsel made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda 
rights. Griffin, Sampson, and Gutierrez all have strong state 
constitutional law underpinnings. Under article I, section 12, 
these cases remain sound law in Utah and the new federal rule is of 
no benefit to the State. 
Regardless of whether Davis would otherwise control, the 
State here did not obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver prior to 
the allegedly equivocal "No" at issue here. 
3 
Transcript, p. 1 (emphasis added). After an arguably equivocal 
invocation of fifth amendment and article I section 12 rights, 
further questioning must be limited to clarification. State v. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sampson, 808 
P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 
(1992); Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 901. Officer Cowley, instead of 
clarifying, resorted to threats and substantive interrogation. 
C. THE POLICE MISCONDUCT IN THE FIRST 
INTERROGATION WAS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION. 
The State attempts to argue throughout its brief that any 
violation which occurred during the first interrogation was only a 
Miranda violation, rather than a full-fledged constitutional 
violation. This is not so. Continued interrogation after only an 
arguably equivocal invocation of article I, section 12 rights is a 
constitutional violation. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P. 2d 894, 902 
(Utah App. 1993) . When the invocation is unequivocal, rather than 
merely arguably equivocal, the constitutional violation is only 
more patent. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-5 ("If, however, 
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioning."). 
The United States Supreme Court first delineated the 
difference between Miranda violations and constitutional violations 
in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 
4 
(1974) (allowing admission of testimony of third party witness 
discovered through unwarned but voluntary confession). Because 
only a violation of Miranda's prophylactic rules occurred rather 
than a constitutional violation, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 
9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) was held inapplicable. 
The Miranda decision discusses both the new prophylactic 
rules as well as the core constitutional protections. The test of 
whether police misconduct is a mere Miranda violation is not 
whether it violates any of the language of the Miranda decision, as 
the State seems to suggest, but rather whether it violates only the 
prophylactic rules announced there. One must look to whether a 
core constitutional right was violated, on the one hand, or whether 
instead the circumstances involve no coercion, the confession was 
voluntary, and there was only a failure to give one or more of 
Miranda's prophylactic warnings. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), cited by the State, is in 
full accord with this proposition: 
There is a vast difference between the direct 
consequences flowing from a coercion of a confession by 
physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to 
break the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences 
of disclosure of a 'guilty secret' freely given in 
response to an unwarned but noncoercive question, as in 
this case. 
Elstad, 4 70 U.S. at 312 (holding that unwarned but voluntary 
confession did not taint subsequent warned confession). 
Where, as here, the full Miranda warnings are given, 
there can be no mere Miranda violation. The prophylactic warnings 
5 
have been given. Any subsequent violation is constitutional -- the 
suspect's privilege against self-incrimination has not been 
respected, and the police have attempted to coerce (or have 
successfully coerced) a confession. 
Here, the police misconduct is a constitutional 
violation. Full Miranda warnings were given. David invoked his 
rights by responding "No" to Officer Cowley's request for 
uncounseled interrogation. Officer Cowley violated David's 
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by 
continuing the interrogation. When David responded to the 
officer's insistence that the interrogation continue by stating "I 
have the right to stop at any time though, " the officer threatened 
him rather than confirm that he did in fact have that right.4 
Independently and collectively, these actions violated Mr. 
Streeter's constitutional rights. 
In Sampson, 808 P. 2d at 1114-7, this Court addressed and 
rejected the identical claim made by the State here. Continued 
interrogation after an invocation of rights is a constitutional 
violation. The Utah Supreme Court declined to address the State's 
"Miranda violation only" contention and denied certiorari. The 
United States Supreme Court likewise declined to accept certiorari 
on that issue. This issue is settled, and the State's position 
must be rejected. 
4See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 ("The mere fact that he may have 
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own 
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any 
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and 
thereafter consents to be questioned."). 
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D. THE POLICE MUST FIRST OBTAIN A VALID 
WAIVER BEFORE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO 
INTERROGATE. 
The State relies on the proposition that police may 
interrogate until there is an unequivocal invocation of the 
suspect's constitutional rights. The State ignores the initial 
requirement of a valid waiver. A suspect's waiver of rights must 
be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444. "' [T] he defendant is given the benefit of every 
reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'" Sampson, 808 P.2d 
at 1108 (quoting State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), 
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S.Ct. 777, 98 L.Ed.2d 864 
(1988)). Here, there was never a valid waiver of rights in the 
first interrogation. David Streeter immediately invoked his 
rights, and the police immediately violated them. 
For the same reason, the State's reliance on Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. , 114 S.Ct 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) 
is misplaced. The Supreme Court stated: 
We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary-
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers 
may continue questioning until and unless the suspect 
clearly requests an attorney. 
129 L.Ed.2d at 373 (emphasis added). Absent a prior waiver (not 
present here), Davis is inapplicable. Even were Davis applicable, 
the State fails to address state constitutional law.5 Both Sampson 
5The State's avoidance of state constitutional issues, brief 
at 9 n.7, is disingenuous. Mr. Streeter briefed a state 
constitutional issue. See Opening Brief at 31 ("Utah should adopt 
a similar rule [requiring new Miranda warnings at subsequent 
interrogations] under Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution."). 
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and Gutierrez have state constitutional underpinnings, and are not 
supplanted by Davis. 
The State asserts that the police obtained a valid waiver 
in the first interrogation, and subsequent substantive 
interrogation was thus proper. State's brief at 19-20. The State 
ignores the fact that " [u] nder Miranda and Edwards, [6] however, an 
accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be 
used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for 
counsel." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490, , 
83 L.Ed.2d 488, 491 (1984) (per curiam); accord Sampson, 808 P.2d 
at 1111 ("The fact that defendant continued to answer questions was 
not a sufficient indication that he was abandoning his right to 
counsel."). David's consent to answer some questions, obtained by 
the State upon further illegal questioning, does not render the 
questioning proper. To the contrary, the fifth amendment and 
article I section 12 violations are ongoing and compounded by the 
further questioning. 
E. THE STATE INCORRECTLY CHARACTERIZES THE 
TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS 
FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
The State attempts to manipulate the standard of review 
to its favor by characterizing the trial court's conclusion 
concerning whether the first interrogation was properly terminated 
as a "subsidiary factual finding," State's brief at 16. "[T]he 
6Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 
378 (1981). 
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trial court's ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of 
defendant's Miranda rights, which conclusions were based upon 
essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of [an 
officer's] colloquy with defendant, present questions of law 
reviewable under a correction-of-error standard." State v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1103. 
The State does the same with the trial court's conclusion 
that David made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights in 
the second interrogation. State's brief at 29. This is an 
ultimate legal conclusion reviewed with no deference. 
F. THE STATE CITES NO AUTHORITY FOR THE 
PROPOSITION THAT THE POLICE HAVE NO DUTY 
TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO A PHONE. 
The State is quick to characterize the precedents cited 
by appellant as "weak," brief at 21, yet does not cite a single 
case stating that the police do not have a duty to provide access 
to a telephone. This is an issue of first impression in Utah. The 
combination of Officer Cowley's threats together with the failure 
to provide access to an attorney resulted in actual compulsion.7 
The State implies that the police were too busy, and 
"simply chose to continue processing and interviewing these people 
rather than to drop their business and do defendant a favor by 
calling his mother." State's brief at 12. Certainly if the police 
7The State's contention that David does not assert that this 
constituted compulsion, State's brief at 20, is incorrect. The 
State further tries to characterize David's claims as sixth 
amendment claims. In fact, they stem from the fifth amendment. 
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-2; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482. 
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had time to interrogate Mr. Streeter, they could provide a phone 
when he specifically requested it in the course of the 
interrogation. 
Even if there is no duty to provide access to a phone in 
the normal case, this is not the normal case. The first 
interrogation involved a complete disregard of David's privilege 
against self-incrimination and repeated threats. David heard his 
rights, immediately tried to invoke them, and was unsuccessful. 
This left him with the impression that he could not invoke his 
rights. In this context, his desire to contact an attorney is most 
understandable -- David wanted the assistance of someone who 
(hopefully) would be able to exercise David's rights and prevent 
further coerced and compelled interrogation. This Court should 
hold as a matter of state constitutional law under article I, 
section 12 that any time the police have violated a suspect's fifth 
amendment rights, and the suspect requests access to an attorney, 
the police have an obligation to provide immediate access to a 
telephone for that purpose. 
POINT 11. THE SECOND INTERROGATION WAS 
UNATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITIES, AND 
INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE THEREIN MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED AS A FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. 
The State's arguments that there was no illegality in the 
first interrogation, as previously set forth, is not well taken. 
The State's argument that the second interrogation is not tainted 
by the first interrogation likewise falls with its argument that 
the initial police conduct was permissible. 
10 
In determining the validity of a confession or 
incriminating statements following police illegality, two 
inquiries must be made. First, the court must determine 
"voluntariness," i.e., whether the confession was 
voluntary; second, the court must determine 
"attenuation," i.e., whether the confession was obtained 
in the course of police exploitation of the prior 
illegality or, in other words, whether the voluntary 
confession was sufficiently attenuated from the prior 
police misconduct to remove any taint. The confession 
must meet both tests to be admissible. 
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) (footnote cites to 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 
416 (1975) , et al, omitted) . 
Brown sets forth factors to be considered in analyzing 
the exploitation issue: (1) the presence of Miranda warnings; (2) 
temporal proximity; (3) presence or absence of intervening 
circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. Id. at 603-4. See also Allen, 839 P.2d at 300-01, 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-1 n.4 (Utah 1990) (recognizing 
Brown factors in search consent context), State v. Thurman, 846 
P. 2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (directing courts to apply Brown 
factors in search consent context). 
A. THE INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS IN THE 
SECOND INTERROGATION WERE OBTAINED 
THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR POLICE 
ILLEGALITY. 
Applying the Brown factors here, the incriminating 
statements were obtained by direct exploitation. 
1• No new Miranda warnings were given. 
The first set of Miranda warnings preceded the police 
illegality. No new Miranda warnings were given. The police only 
addressed the right to counsel in the second interrogation. After 
11 
the failure of the police to honor David's invocation of rights in 
the first interrogation, full Miranda warnings should have been 
given in the second. The State fails to cite a single case where 
the police violated a suspect's rights, and a court held that 
additional complete Miranda warnings were not required. The cases 
cited by the State deal with circumstances where there has been no 
police illegality, and the defendant has already waived his rights 
on one or more previous occasions. 
Mr. Streeter's initial Miranda warning is not effective 
at the subsequent interrogation because the police refused to honor 
his rights in the first interrogation, and the State obtained no 
waiver. The State asks this court to set a dangerous precedent --
police would be free to ignore a defendant's rights, convince the 
defendant through conduct that he has no rights, and then obtain 
"valid" waivers and confessions without a new recitation of rights. 
This Court should decline to make such a mockery of the 
prophylactic protections announced in Miranda. 
2. The second interrogation was 
proximal to the first. 
Only an hour or two had passed from the first 
interrogation, and David was held incommunicado from his attorney 
and family. The State's assertion that the presence of other 
prisoners in the holding cells makes David's incarceration 
something other than incommunicado, brief at 11, is not well taken. 
These individuals were not in a position to accurately advise David 
as to his rights, or assist in ensuring that they were respected 
and honored by the police. To the contrary, the only way others in 
12 
the holding cell could have affected David's case is as snitches 
testifying on behalf of the State. 
3. There were no intervening 
circumstances. 
The State tries to argue that Officer Cowley's 
termination of the first interrogation, after David's fourth 
invocation of his rights, is somehow an intervening circumstance. 
State's brief at 25. That the police ultimately ceased further 
violations of David's rights does not in any way constitute an 
intervening circumstance; instead, it was a bare minimum 
constitutional requirement. A recognition of the police illegality 
and a formal apology, coupled with access to a phone, might stand 
on different footing. However, even 4M years later, the State 
still has refused to admit any illegality, much less apologize for 
it. Full Miranda warnings, coupled with either consultation with 
counsel or arraignment before a magistrate, would likely purge the 
taint. Here, there were no intervening circumstances, and the 
taint has not been purged. 
4. The purpose of the illegality was to 
obtain a confession, and the conduct 
was flagrant. 
Finally, the purpose of the illegality was ably stated by 
Detective Cowley: "So I want the truth out of you and I want it 
now." Transcript at 2. The State even admits the purpose was to 
"encourage him to tell the truth." State's brief at 25. When the 
suspect has expressed that he is not interested in discussing the 
matter with the police without an attorney, such "encouragement" 
13 
(properly read: coercion and compulsion) is a flagrant8 fifth 
amendment violation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-4 (discussing 
coercive police tactics, including "display[ing] an air of 
confidence in the suspect's guilt", id. at 450, conceding the right 
to silence but maintaining questioning, id. at 453-4, and pleas for 
the truth, id. at 454). 
B. THE POLICE DID NOT OBTAIN A VALID WAIVER 
OF RIGHTS AT THE SECOND INTERROGATION. 
Case law uniformly requires that a suspect be advised of 
his or her rights at the time of interrogation. E.g. , Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 469 ("whatever the background of the person interrogated, 
a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable"). 
"[T]his warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No 
amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been 
aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead." Id. at 
471-2. 
The State here attempts to use David's prior receipt of 
Miranda warnings to show his awareness of his rights, despite the 
police officer's failure to respect his repeated invocations of his 
rights. This is impermissible. In State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351 
(Utah App. 1993), a category I correctional officer was charged 
with lewdness involving a child. This Court addressed the 
8Mr. Streeter nominally agrees with the State that the 
"conduct cannot by any stretch of the imagination be termed 
flagrant." State's brief at 25. Imagination is not necessary at 
all. The flagrancy is obvious and apparent on a bare examination 
of the facts here. 
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contention that this officer suspect did not have to be read his 
full Miranda rights where the record establishes his knowledge of 
his rights as a result of his status as an officer: 
[W] e reject the State's contention that defendant's 
assumed knowledge of his rights can be used as a basis 
for neglecting to give him the requisite Miranda warnings 
to which every other United States citizen is entitled. 
This court refuses to engage in the kind of arbitrary 
line drawing that would necessarily result if we were to 
accept the State's argument, 
Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358. 
The State again approaches this Court seeking arbitrary 
line drawing -- where a suspect has once been read his rights, his 
repeated invocations have been ignored, and the police later desire 
to interrogate again, the State seeks a rule whereby a complete 
second recitation of the Miranda warnings is not required. This 
Court should again decline to engage in such fine line drawing. 
Certainly, following any police misconduct a complete re-reading of 
the Miranda warnings should be a bare minimum requirement.9 
Detective Cowley failed to ask a very important question 
at the second interrogation -- whether David's desire to speak was 
motivated in any way by the threats Cowley had made at the first 
interrogation. The prior misconduct in this case makes it 
9The State asserts that Mr. Streeter has waived this claim. 
State's brief at 28. The State ignores counsel's argument to the 
trial court: 
[by defense counsel] . . . and that any subsequent 
interview must have a reMirandizing portion followed by 
a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
R. 239:15-17. 
[by defense counsel] It is incumbent upon them to 
reMirandize and to make sure that any waiver there is a 
knowing and intelligent waiver. 
R. 253:4-7. 
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distinguishable from the cases relied on by the State. Elstad 
involved an unwarned, voluntary, non-coercive confession followed 
by a properly warned written confession that was introduced at 
trial. Here, we have the converse: a properly warned but coercive 
and non-voluntary first interrogation, followed by an improperly 
warned second interrogation. To the extent Elstad is applicable at 
all to this case, it supports David Streeter's position. It 
provides: 
When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that 
passes between confessions, the change in the place of 
interrogations, and the change of identity of the 
interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has 
carried over into the second confession. See Westover v. 
United States, decided together with Miranda v. Arizona 
[ ]. The failure of police to administer Miranda 
warnings does not mean that the statements received have 
actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume 
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has 
not been intelligently exercised. New York v. Ouarles, 
467 U.S. [649,] 654 and n.5, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 
550 [(1984)]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457, 86 S.Ct. 
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Of the courts that have considered 
whether a properly warned confession must be suppressed 
because it was preceded by an unwarned but clearly 
voluntary admission, the majority have explicitly or 
implicitly recognized that Westover's requirement of a 
break in the stream of events is inapposite. In these 
circumstances, a careful and thorough administration of 
Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that 
rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. The 
warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter 
the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to 
remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an "act of 
free will." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S., at 486, 
83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11 (footnote cites omitted). 
Westover v. United States, was a companion case decided 
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694 (1966) . See id. , 470 U.S. at 494-497. Westover was 
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interrogated the night of his arrest by a local police agency, and 
the following morning, all without warnings. At noon, FBI agents 
took over the interrogation, gave warnings, and obtained a 
confession two or so hours later. The Supreme Court held the 
warnings given by the FBI were insufficient to remove the prior 
taint. "In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of 
constitutional rights cannot be assumed." 470 U.S. at 496. A 
break in the chain of events is required. 
State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 (Utah App. 1994), cited 
by the State at 29, is easily distinguishable. In Hilfiker, the 
police had obtained a valid waiver of rights at the first 
interrogation. When Hilfiker exercised his rights, that invocation 
was scrupulously honored by the police. Hilfiker initiated the 
second interrogation, and the officer confirmed that Hilfiker was 
giving up the right to counsel he had previously asserted. Here, 
there was no valid prior waiver, the police engaged in misconduct, 
and obtained only a partial waiver at the second interrogation. 
Hilfiker is inapplicable here. 
This case is closest to Westover. In both, there was 
coercive interrogation. While Westover was not warned in his first 
interrogation, David fared even worse. He was warned, but the 
police refused to honor his invocation of rights. David received 
a clear message that the warnings were meaningless, and he had no 
rights. Westover received complete Miranda warnings when the FBI 
took over the interrogation. Despite the complete warnings, and 
Westover's actions in responding to further questioning, the 
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Supreme Court could not find a proper waiver. Here, David Streeter 
did not even receive complete warnings prior to the second 
interrogation. His purported waiver of unrespected rights 
contained in a distant memory cannot survive scrutiny. Under the 
circumstances, David Streeter's "waiver" was not knowing or 
voluntary. 
Westover sets forth some of the factors to be considered, 
including (1) whether a different authority conducts the second 
interrogation, (2) the location has changed, (3) significant time 
has passed, (4) the suspect has been read his rights, and (5) the 
suspect has been given an opportunity to exercise them. Here, the 
same officer who previously threatened David and refused to honor 
his rights also conducted the second interrogation. While some 
time had passed, this consideration is tempered by the fact that 
David was not allowed access to his attorney or his mother. David 
was not read his rights; rather the State relied on incorporation 
of his prior (unrespected) reading of rights. Absent a complete 
reading of rights, David had a reduced ability to assert them. As 
in Westover, no waiver can be found under these circumstances. 
As in Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358, imposing a requirement 
that police re-Mirandize suspects at the beginning of each discreet 
interrogation poses no hardship on law enforcement personnel. This 
clear-cut rule promotes consistency in the law, and fully apprises 
officers of what is expected. Certainly any time the police 
violate a suspect's rights, Miranda warnings should be required at 
all subsequent interrogations. 
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Even had Mr. Streeter received full Miranda warnings at 
the second interrogation, that would not end the inquiry: 
The nature and degree of the illegality will usually be 
inversely related to the effectiveness of time and 
intervening events to dissipate the presumed taint. 
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean 
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and 
the consent to find the consent valid. For example, 
Justice Powell in Brown suggested that, where it appears from the facts that the police purposely engaged in the 
conduct to induce a confession, an intervening 
consultation with counsel or presentation before a 
magistrate may be required before the taint can be 
removed. 422 U.S. at 611, 95 S.Ct at 2265-66 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 (emphasis added) . Here the taint of the 
officer's refusal to honor David's rights and the threats made, for 
the admitted purpose of obtaining the truth right then and there, 
could only be dissipated by full Miranda warnings and either 
consultation with counsel or arraignment before a magistrate. The 
incomplete warnings were insufficient to break the chain of events 
and dissipate the taint of the prior police misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
David Streeter respectfully requests that the order of 
the trial court denying his motion to suppress be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <^  l day of April, 1995. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN ~~ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Transcript of September 22, 1990 Interrogations 
O.K. I'm Detective Cowley with the police department and 




Spell you last name for me. 
Streeter 
What is your date of birth? 
09-14-72 
And you address? 
3551 South 7200 West 
Your home phone number? 
250-9546 
Have you been advised of your rights? 
Yes 
Ifm going to.do it again. You have the right to remain 
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you 
in a court of lav. You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
and. have, him present with you while you are being 
questioned. " * if "you cannot *af f 6rd~a* hire a* lawyer, • one - vill 
be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you 
wish. You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights 
and not answer any questions or make any statements, po you 
understand these rights that I have explained to you? 
Yes 
Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now 
without an attorney present? 
No 
You don't want to talk to us? 
I don't know why I am really even in here. All I was doing 
was sleeping over at my friends lawn last night and the cops 
just come ripping in the yard and arrested us and 
Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you, 
would you be willing to answer those questions without a 
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lawyer present. 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't 
know why I am here. 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will 
answer the ones you want to answer? 
DSz Yes I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well, Ifll tell you right now that if you take that attitude 
with us. 
DS: Well I ainft trying to 
TC: Because we have all the vitnesses we need and we know who 
has done what and who has done what to who. So I want the 
truth out of you and I want it now. Now do you understand 
that? 
Yes 
Who were you with tonight 
J.D. 
Who else? 
Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you have to 
do is call my mom and he vill be down here. 
You want your attorney? 
Yes 




Interview with David Streeter 
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said that you 
wanted to talk to a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Nov is it your desire and you come forth voluntarily that 
you want to talk to me now? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Go ahead* 
DS: Just tell the story. 
TC: Tell the story. 
DS: O.K. we was just coming home from that party... 
TC: Now hold on, you say "we" who is "we". 
DS: It was me and Bart in the car In his car 
TC: Now does Bart go by Kevin. 
DS: Yes 
TC: And who's car is that? 
DS: Bart's car, and some guy, he had his brights on, Bart did, 
and that guy in front of us. 
TC: Which direction were you going? 
DS: West 
TC: So you were going West on? 
DS: On 41, so then he pulled over and let us go ahead of him and* 
then he pulled behind us and turned his brights on. 
So we pulled over and let him go in front of us and we 
pulled down the street and then he started to get out of his 
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car and so ve jumped out of our car and he got back in his 
and I smacked the window. 
TC: With vhat? 
OS: My hand, and then (inaud) 
TC: You don't knov vho they vere? 
DS: Mo 
TC: Did you ever kick the car? 
DS: No, I didn't kick the car* And then he drove away and then 
ve vas going back to my house and ve drove by 41 and ve got 
back from 41 and vent to 72 and he vas at the 7-11 and he 
started saying shit to us so ve pulled over vent back and 
walked up to him. 
TC: So after the occurrence of hitting the car and kicking the 
car, then he left- Then you left right after him? 
DS: No, about 5 minutes. 
TC: So, on your vay to your house you sav. 
DS: Yes, ve got back on 41 and he vas at the 7-11. 
TC: You sav the station vagon at the 7-11? 
DS: Yes, and they started yelling shit at us. 
TC: Which 7-11 vere you at? 
DS: The one on 4100 and 6400. 
TC: So you drove by and you sav the car there? 
DS: And he started yelling shit at us and so ve pulled over and 
walked up there. 
TC: Where did you pull over at? 
DS: Just on 4100. 
TC: So you didn't pull into the 7-11 parking lot? 
DS: And he had a hammer and he said "Nov I can kick your guys 
ass91, something to that effect. So he vas coming at us and 
so I picked a rock up and threw it at him. 
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TC: Hov big was the rock? 
DS: Just a little bigger than a golf ball. 
BS: Biggej^that^a^golf_baJJ^ajid^ 
OS: Yes; a lot smaller than a soft ball, smaller than a 
baseball* 
TC: So you picked up a rock, where did you get the rock from? 
OS: Just on the ground, I just reached down and grabbed it. 
TC: And then you threw it and hit him in the head. 
DS: I guess, it nix: nun--in-*cne-«^ nead/ I don't know. A L U /a^ 
really.qoinq to: do was scare^him; try to .get him to-back-.ua 
vi th—the~- hammer. 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: cL^qtiess _he-_hi t^Barfc: wi thi:tha t- hammer::* 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: Then*.-the-girl-jumped "oBLae-. 
TC: What did they do? 
DS: Wrestled; me;^to_the_ground,^and^then^I__goti.upland-*- t-crotr * thai-
guy of f. 3art~ and._I..said.Jflet_rs get. out- of -here " . 
TC: Did you do anything else to that guy besides throw a rock at 
him and hit him. 
DS: Iijaight~have- kicked^himr 
TC: Where? 
DS: /In*" the: chest^ ( inaud) 
TC: Was he laying on the ground when you did that? 
DS: He was on top of Bart-* 
TC: Did you do a n y t h i n g e l s e . 
DS: No 
TC: You didn't hit him in the head and chest and you didn't grab 
a rock and hit him in the head with a rock. 
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OS: Oh, tfcihitr hincvhexuLLthrey^tha.t.rocJcthe^f i r s t^.t.ime^ 
TC: But you d i d n ' t h i t him with a rock a f ter that? 
OS: No 
TC: But you didn't hit him in the head. 
OS: No, (inaud) 
TC: Did you hit him with anything else? 
OS: No 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: We took off and vent back to my house and sat there and 
everybody- vas"- leaving^ and— Dustixu and- Ron-iand Herd:—L they^vas. 
l^jvingi^and^Lriguessl they-Vent^ito_the^:.7^rli^to^ get_ gas
 t- I 
don't know. We vas all getting ready for bed and the next 
thing you know Nelcd-vasl knocking;: atl-the^ .. door-; 
TC: Who is Nerd? 
DS: Nerd is Cody. 
DS: And he says "some guy started a fight dovn there vith 
Dustin^. 
TC: Dovn vhere? 
DS: The 7-11. 
TC: Which one? 
DS: 3500 and 7200. 
TC: Go ahead. 
DS: So ve -ran dovn there*.... 
TC: Nov you say "ve"/ vho is "ve"? 
DS: Me and J.D. and Nerd vas vith as. 
TC: So Cody. 
DS: And that is all that vas in the house. 
TC: What about Kevin? 
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OS: 0h y e s , Bart t oo . 
TC: So you guys vent down to the 7-11 to help Dustin out? 
OS: res 
TC: Then what happened? 
OS: There were tvc guys chasing him around the parking lot* 
TC: Chasing Oustin? 
OS: Yes and I donft know where Ron was* Ron wasn't helping him. 
And the one run uo to Bart; Oustin was backing up and..Bart, 
walked up by him and one grabbed Bart and.•thr^v him aoa?n^ 
,the car and Ouscm came from around the side of hinandv 
nunched him and dropped him. 
TC: With one punch? 
OS: Yes 
TC: And he fell down on the ground and this was in the parking 
lot of 7-11. 
OS: Yes 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: Then-- the^.other»?one* had*^*Jay~ by~the-*- hair*»-and.- so^ -*- we- ran-- upt 
there? and got hia~off~and~ve~justre*t"ook*"rbff .-
TC: Who kicked this guy on the ground? 
OS: I kicked him once. 
TC: Where? 
OS: In the head. 
TC: Did you see anyone else kick him? 
OS: No 
TC; So after Dustin hit him and this guy fell down on the ground 
you kicked him in the head? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you didn't see anyone else kick him? 
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OS: I was getting out of there, all I did vas vent and got that 
guy off Jay and ve book off runnina bad to mv iousa-. 
TC: Who is "ve"? 
OS: <Me and: Jay and Bart> Bart vas probably already at my house* 
I just told them to get out of there• 
TC: Who had the gun? 
OS: Jay had a BB quit. 
TC: When did he get that? 
OS: Probably after ve vent back to the house, I didnft even knov 
he had it cause I took off, I vas getting out of there I 
didn't vant nothing to do vith cops. 
TC: So you vent back to your house and did you guys come back to 
the 7-11 again after J.D. got the gun? 
OS: No, the Jeep came up: by my house from the parking lot vith. a* 
crovbax and vas going to kill Dustin. 
TC: From vhat parking lot? 
OS: Ream's, so_ve^.all ran. over^there and 
TC: So you ran over to the Ream's parking lot to help Oustin? 
DS: Just to see vhat vas going on because all ve.~ couldr.heaar.vas 
Oustin saying "he's aot a.crovbar" or something* 
PC: And that's vhen J.D. had the gun. 
DS: Yes, cause vhen I got over there that is vhen J.D. had the 
gun. 
CC: Who's gun does that belong to? 
DS: It vas JayJs-
TC: Where is the gun nov? 
DS: I have-no idea. 
TC: You don't knov vhat happened to it? 
DS: No, I vas getting out of there. I didn't vant nothing to-do 
vith it. 
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TC: What did you see J.O. do with the gun, did you see him point 
it at anybody? 
DS: He just: had it in his hand, he didn't point it at anybody. 
TC: Did he point it at anybody, did he shoot at anybody? 
DS: No, it wasn't loaded (inaud) 
TC: Then after the altercation in the parking lot at Ream's what 
happened? 
DS: That guy left and then we left and ve vent over to Jay's 
house* 
TC: So you didn't go back down by the 7-11 to check on this 
other guy. So you don't know what happened to him? But geaccc 
kicked him once in the^heac while he was 9x1 the. ground?. 
DS: Her was on his i/ay iovxi. 
TC: Did you see anybody else kick him or hit him on the ground, 
how about Kevin? 
DS: The only time I sav Bart was vhen that guy had him up 
against the car and Dust in smacked that guy and he was on 
his was down and _I kicked him and that is the last time I 
seen Kevin, (inaud) 
TC: Going back to the first incident at the 7-11 on 6400 West 
how many times- did you hit and kick that guy? 
DS: i kicked him one .time and 1 don't: even- think I hit him. 
TC: Xou didn't hit hin yith your fist? 
DS: Xo 
TC: So you only hit him once vith a rock and that was in the 
head? 
DS: I guess so 
TC: And then you Jcicked him in the head? 
DS: No 
TC: Where did you kick him? 
DS: Across the sL^ JIdL^ -' 
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TC: Across the shoulder, vas he laying on the ground vhen you 
kicked him? 
OS: He vas on too of Bart. 
TC: What did you see Bart do to him? 
DS: (inaud) I didn't have a chance, them girls jumped on my 
quick. 
TC: What did they do? 
OS: Just vrestled me down. 
TC: What did you do to the girls? 
DS: Just pushed them avay and told them to back off. 
TC: You didn't hit them vith your fist or kick them? 
DS: No, I vouldn't hit a girl. 
TC: You didn't hit them vith a rock* 
DS: No, that ladv came after me vith a hammer. 
TC: Did vou hit her vith a rock? 
DS: No 
TC: Did you throw a rock at her? 
DS: No 
TC: You are sure? 
DS: I'm positive. 
